\$title Parts Supply Problem w/ 3 Types w/o Asymmetric Information (PS3_F,SEQ=363) \$onText Hideo Hashimoto, Kojun Hamada, and Nobuhiro Hosoe, "A Numerical Approach to the Contract Theory: the Case of Adverse Selection", GRIPS Discussion Paper 11-27, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Tokyo, Japan, March 2012. http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/en/discussion_papers/11-27/ Keywords: nonlinear programming, contract theory, principal-agent problem, adverse selection, parts supply problem \$offText option limCol = 0, limRow = 0; Set i 'type of supplier' / 0, 1, 2 /; Alias (i,j); Parameter theta(i) 'efficiency' / 0 0.1, 1 0.2, 2 0.3 / p(i) 'probability of type' / 0 0.2, 1 0.5, 2 0.3 /; Scalar ru 'reservation utility' / 0 /; * Definition of Primal/Dual Variables Positive Variable x(i) "quality" b(i) "maker's revenue" w(i) "price"; Variable Util "maker's utility"; Equation obj "maker's utility function" rev(i) "maker's revenue function" pc(i) "participation constraint"; obj.. Util =e= sum(i, p(i)*(b(i) - w(i))); rev(i).. b(i) =e= x(i)**(0.5); pc(i).. w(i) - theta(i)*x(i) =g= ru; * Setting Lower Bounds on Variables to Avoid Division by Zero x.lo(i) = 0.0001; Model FB3 / all /; solve FB3 maximizing Util using nlp;